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"It was August 13 '54, I was five years old, depending where you're counting from."[***]

I. Introduction
{1} Following the coming new year, the Y2K Problem [1] will create problems worldwide. While the exact
extent of its harm is open to debate, [2] therhe is no disagreement over its inevitability. In fact, some
computer-related companies (including the makers of Norton Anti-Virus [3] and Quicken for Windows [4]
have already been sued for damages arising from allegedly non-Y2K-compliant products. [5] While various
actors at all levels of business and government will be subject to legal liability for such malfunctions, [6] this
article will examine the legal liability of software producers and engineers under current remedial theories.
Software manufacturers are a logical choice for this examination because they will likely be ultimately liable
for most Y2K errors. For instance, if an individual sues his bank for miscalculation of interest arising from
Y2K errors, the bank will, in turn, bring an action against the maker of the software responsible for such
calculations. This scenario will repeat itself in many contexts.
{2} Most non-tort remedies will not adequately protect plaintiffs harmed by non-Y2K-compliant software, as
discussed later in this case note. The traditional tort negligence action will often be the primary basis for
these claims. Negligence law, however, frequently under-compensates plaintiffs seeking recovery for
damages. Software companies will be held to the usual "reasonable actor" standard in assessing liability. In
light of the extensive modern reliance on computer systems and the resulting immense damages from
malfunctions, an elevated standard of care similar to a medical malpractice standard is appropriate. Case law
has not developed this higher standard, despite some early indications that it would. Thus, a statutory
standard is needed. Furthermore, because triers of fact across the country will arrive at varying standards of
conduct for defendants in identical situations, a uniform standard of conduct is in order. From a policy
standpoint, this uniform statutory standard of care would not only impose an elevated standard of care on a
professional industry relied upon in nearly every facet of modern life and provide uniformity and clarity to
juries in their determination of negligence, but it would also allow software producers to assess their potential
liability from a common elucidated standard.
{3} This article will explain the Y2K problem, address the failure of remedies other than the common
negligence tort to adequately compensate those harmed by non-Y2K-compliant software, describe the
problems with the common negligence tort, such as the lack of an appropriately high standard of care and a
lack of uniform application nationwide, in light of the judicial rejection of the computer malpractice tort,
which could correct those two problems, assert that statutory guidance is therefore necessary in this matter,
examine industry standards upon which to base such a statute, and propose and evaluate a substantive statute
designed to hold all software producers to a uniform elevated standard and to create a rebuttable presumption
of negligence upon its violation.

II. The Y2K Problem [7]

A. The Miscalculation Itself
{4} The Y2K Problem is borne from the use of only the final two digits of a year, rather than the entire four,
to signify the calendar year in many business software application programs written in the past two decades.
[8] Thus, the years 1900 to 1999 were represented with the numerals "00" to "99" inclusively. This
abridgement saved computer programmers time, effort, limited disk space, and processing memory. [9]
Conserving the latter was a particularly strong rationale, for, in the 1960's and 1970's a megabyte of memory
could cost tens of thousands of dollars. [10] Most of the computer systems created using this shorthand have
not survived to today, but as later systems arose they were made compatible with the earlier versions, thereby
perpetuating the condition. [11] Miscalculations occur when such programs must recognize dates before 1900
or after 1999. [12] If the problem has not been addressed, the computer will interpret the date abbreviated
"00" to be 1900, when it is in fact 2000, and make identical interpretations for 2001, 2002, etc. [13] For
example, on January 1, 2000, a computer attempting to determine the age of an individual born in 1984
would take the current year ("00" to the computer), subtract the year of birth ('84), and conclude the person's
age to be "-84". The computer may conclude that the person at issue is yet to be born. This particular example
would not occur until the year 2000, but various malfunctions have already occurred. For instance, the
Philadelphia Police Department became a victim of the Y2K Problem well before 2000. [14] As early as the
mid-1980's, when virtually no one had heard of the impending complications, the Department's software
strangely began deleting the records of active parolees. [15] The software was supposed to delete only the
records of parolees whose parole periods had expired. Instead, it considered anyone whose parole was slated
to end after 2000, as having already ended in the early 1900's and thus deleted their files. [16]
{5} In other instances, a computer network that scheduled patients' appointments for over seventy health care
facilities shut down when an appointment for January 2000 was entered, a state prison computer ordered the
incorrect early release of some prisoners it thought had already served their sentences, and a corned beef
company destroyed recently made product under the mistaken assumption that it was almost a century old.
[17] Some Y2K-induced injuries are already the subject of lawsuits. For example, in Produce Palace
International v. Tec-America Corp., the plaintiff alleged that a cash register system installed in 1995 lacked
the ability to process credit cards expiring on or after the year 2000. [18] The cash registers presumably
interpreted a credit card expiring in 2002 as having expired in 1902, and thus rejected it. [19]
B. The Problem's Scope
{6}The Y2K Problem is most prevalent in mainframe systems because they generally hold older data and
programs than personal computers ("PCs"). [20] Any computer system that performs date calculations is
vulnerable, [21] however, and this clearly includes PCs. When one starts a PC, certain read-only software
(called "BIOS" for Basic Input/Output System) controls the startup process, including management of data
such as the time and date. [22] Most common PC-operating systems like DOS, Windows, and OS/2 will not
be affected by the Y2K Problem as they can calculate dates beyond 2000. [23] In PCs, thus, the problem
should be relatively limited. External software problems, however, are potentially more vulnerable. Any
external software program relying on date calculations in its performance is subject to the Y2K Problem, as
in the Philadelphia Police Department example above. [24] Vulnerable components will either miscalculate
dates or simply shut down. [25] Fixing the Y2K Problem in these contexts is a simple task, requiring the lineby-line examination and revision of all computer code within the system or the issuance of a Y2K-compliant
software upgrade. [26] Date fields must be converted from the common six-digit format (dd/mm/yy) into an
eight-digit format (dd/mm/yyyy). [27] The cost to fix each line of code is estimated at one dollar. [28] This
seemingly simple task is daunting, however, in scope. For example, the Prudential Insurance Company of
America estimates it must correct 125 million lines of code. [29] AT&T, Federal Express, and General
Motors must each examine 500 million lines. [30] Their estimated costs are easily calculable.
{7} The Y2K Problem extends beyond the realm of mainframes, PCs, and software. Electronic control

devices known as "embedded systems" operate from computer chips hidden within thousands of products.
[31] Billions of them are in use every day. [32] If an embedded chip relies on date calculations in its
functions, the Y2K Problem could arise. Automatic teller machines, car ignition control systems, parking
meters, trains and buses, hotel room keys, coffeemakers, clocks, refrigerators, air traffic control systems, and
air-conditioning systems are just some of the myriad of examples. [33] Most embedded chips will not
malfunction on January 1, 2000, either because they do not recognize dates, or in some cases, because it does
not matter if the system does not recognize the year 2000. [34] Susan E. Thomas, a Y2K consultant for
Unisys Corporation, estimates that only four to six percent of embedded chips will experience problems. [35]
Even with such a small percentage of malfunctions, the billions of these devices operating on earth will create
a large number of failures. [36] In fact, embedded chips, like hardware and software, have already
malfunctioned in a similar date computation context. As it became December 31, 1996, production came to a
halt at New Zealand Aluminum Smelters when embedded chips ceased functioning; they had not been
programmed to recognize the 366th day of the year resulting from the added leap day. [37] The resultant lack
of temperature regulation damaged equipment costing over one million dollars to repair. [38] While this
article is primarily concerned with software vendor liability, the embedded chip manufacturer will find itself
in a similar, if not identical, position.
{8} The Y2K Problem will go unfixed to some degree. Gartner Group, Inc., an information technology
research firm, has estimated that more than eighty percent of companies will experience some Y2K-related
malfunctions and that thirty percent of companies will experience malfunctions in critical systems that will
substantially impact the company's possibility of survival. [39] Business Week has reported that between 1998
and 2001, the Y2K Problem could cost U.S. business $119 billion in lost economic output. [40]
{9} The most commonly-cited estimate of worldwide cost to repair the Y2K Problem in this context lies
between $300 billion and $600 billion. [41] Others have estimated the repair cost at $1.6 trillion. [42] The
U.S. government is variously estimated to spend between four and ten billion dollars; the states as a whole
around two billion. [43] These costs are just to fix the problem; resultant litigation costs may reach $1.4
trillion. [44]

III. The Inadequacy of Remedies Other Than the Common Negligence Tort
{10} A central tenet of this article is the inadequacy of the common negligence tort remedy in future Y2K
litigation. It is that inadequacy that prefaces the call for a uniform, elevated standard of care in Y2K
negligence cases. Resort to that under-compensatory standard, however, is necessitated largely because
remedies outside the realm of negligence torts are equally, if not more, inadequate as negligence actions, and
cannot be so easily altered to provide adequate protection. Simply put, most non-negligence causes of action
are quite immutably undercompensatory, and negligence causes of action are less undercompensatory and
less immutable. Before one can propose a new standard, one must examine the weaknesses of the current
standard.
A. The Inadequacy of Actions in Contract
{11} The foremost issue in any Y2K litigation based on contract is whether the relevant contract is a
transaction involving "goods," for, if it is, the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") will apply. [45] The
U.C.C. defines a good as "all things which are movable at the time of identification to the contract." [46]
Hardware is easily identifiable as such, but software is a trickier question. Courts have generally determined
software to be a "good" as defined in the U.C.C.; thereby determining that it thus falls under its purview. [47]
The U.C.C. then becomes the logical tool for enforcing contract rights. Under the U.C.C., a plaintiff injured
by breach of contract has various grounds for recovery, but all will generally fail in their attempt to properly
compensate for losses incurred.

{12} Under U.C.C. Section 2-602, a buyer has the right to reject non-conforming goods upon delivery. [48]
Of course, most, if not all, buyers are precluded from this option because upon delivery of the goods they had
no knowledge of their nonconformity. [49] When the problem becomes evident, it is then almost certainly too
late to exercise rights under this "perfect tender rule." [50]
{13} U.C.C. Section 2-608 allows a buyer to revoke acceptance of nonconforming goods within a reasonable
period of time if the nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the goods and the goods were accepted
without discovery of the nonconformity. [51] Successful revocation of acceptance entitles the buyer to a
refund. [52] Here again, time precludes most recovery. Revocation of acceptance must occur within a
reasonable time after the buyer knows or should have known of the nonconformity. [53] Vendors have a
strong argument that, in light of widespread societal recognition of the Y2K Problem in recent years and a
particularly pervasive recognition among those who rely on computers for business purposes, every buyer
should have been aware of potential Y2K noncompliance long ago and all reasonable time periods to revoke
acceptance have lapsed. [54]
{14} In addition to rejection of the goods or revocation of their acceptance, the U.C.C. provides actions for
breach of express and implied warranties. [55] Section 2-313 provides for express warranties arising from
promises, affirmations of fact, descriptions of the goods, or samples or models that become a part of the basis
of the bargain. [56] Whether language creates an express warranty is generally a question for a trier of fact.
[57] Any contract for the sale of goods also automatically includes an implied warranty of merchantability (if
the seller is a "merchant" of such goods), which is a promise that the goods are "fit for the ordinary purposes
for which such goods are used." [58] Also, if at the time the contract is entered the seller "has reason to know
of (1) any particular purpose for which the buyer requires the goods and (2) that the buyer is relying upon the
seller's skill or judgment" in his selection, then an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose will
also attach. [59] Warranties protect buyers by awarding them the difference between the value of the goods as
accepted and the value the goods had they been as warranted, along with incidental and consequential
damages. [60]
{15} A software company, however, can easily avoid liability for breach of warranty. The U.C.C. itself
instructs sellers how to legally disclaim implied warranties. [61] An implied warranty of merchantability is
disclaimed merely by use of language that mentions merchantability and is conspicuous if written. [62] An
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is disclaimed by written conspicuous language. [63] Even
the simple use of the phrase "as is" is sufficient to disclaim all implied warranties under the U.C.C. [64]
Express warranties generally cannot be disclaimed, [65] but it is simple enough not to make them: a
manufacturer need only ensure that it makes no promises (in the form contemplated by Section 2-313) of
Y2K-compliance in the sale of its product.
{16} Sellers further reduce buyers' potential remedies through direct contractual limits on remedies and
damages. The U.C.C. states that a contract may substitute its remedies for those of the U.C.C. and may limit
remedies to "return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replacement." [66] Consequential
damages also may be limited; [67] another obstacle to adequate recovery is then put in place.
{17} Taken singularly, any one of the limits on U.C.C. liability described above would probably not pose too
large a problem overall. Most software vendors, however, have prudently limited customers' rights under the
purchase contract. The end-user license agreement for Microsoft's word processing software, Word 97 is a
good example. It reads in relevant part:
By installing, copying or otherwise using the software product, you agree to be bound by
the terms of this [contract].
Microsoft's and its suppliers' entire liability and your exclusive remedy shall be, at

Microsoft's option, either (a) return of the price paid, if any, or (b) repair or replacement of
the software product [if it is] returned to Microsoft with a copy of your receipt. [68]
To the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, Microsoft and its suppliers disclaim
all other warranties and conditions, either express or implied, including, but not limited to,
implied warranties of merchantability . . . [and] fitness for a particular purpose . . .with
regard to this software product . . .
To the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, in no event shall Microsoft or its
suppliers be liable for any special, incidental, indirect, or consequential damages
whatsoever (including without limitation, damages for loss of business profits, business
interruption, loss of business information, or any other pecuniary loss) arising out of the
use of or inability to use the software product . . . . In any case, Microsoft's entire liability
under any provision of this [contract] shall be limited to the greater of the amount actually
paid by you for the software product or U.S. $5.00. [69]
{18} Thus, consolidated, the result is a severe, if not total, limit on a plaintiff's ability to recover under the
U.C.C. Microsoft has conditioned a purchaser's use of the product upon acceptance of an agreement that
delineates the meager remedies of repair and replacement, disclaims all warranties to the law's fullest extent,
and limits damages on the whole and those consequential in nature. [70]
{19} Perhaps the largest hurdle for a plaintiff contemplating a contract suit is one that need not be mentioned
in the contract itself - the statute of limitations. An action on a contract governed by the U.C.C. must be
brought within four years after the cause of action has accrued. [71] Section 2-725(2) states that, "[a] cause of
action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A
breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made . . . ." [72] The timing of the buyer's knowledge of
the good's defect is of no consequence. Much computer equipment suffering from Y2K-related defects was
sold long enough ago to bar claims under this limitation. [73] After all, a buyer of defective software in 1987,
for example, was very likely unaware of the Y2K Problem in 1991 when the statute of limitations on his
contractual claim expired. [74]
{20} These exculpatory clauses and the nature of the U.C.C. statute of limitations create an
undercompensatory regime for plaintiffs seeking to recover on Y2K-related claims. [75] Software purchasers
must incur time, money, and opportunity costs on a large scale in any attempt to prevail upon an action
founded on one of these well-drafted agreements. [76]
B. The Inadequacy of Product Liability Actions
{21} Products liability law also provides inadequate remedies to plaintiffs in the Y2K context. The basic
statement of strict liability in tort is stated in Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts, which reads
in relevant part:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby cause to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold. [77]

Most states have adopted this provision by statute or judicial decision. [78] A close reading of this section
reveals that a seller is subject to liability for physical injuries; there is no mention of manufacturer liability for
purely economic loss.[79] In fact, while a small number of jurisdictions have allowed recovery of
consequential economic damages, [80] the vast majority of cases disallow such recovery in strict liability tort
actions, [81] likely upon the outdated notion that contract law is sufficient to compensate harmed parties. [82]
This "economic loss doctrine" will be inapplicable in the Y2K malfunction cases that involve personal
physical injury or property damage, while a cause of action in product liability may lie. But, in many Y2K
malfunction cases plaintiffs will seek recovery of solely economic damages, such as lost profits. [83] Thus,
strict liability product actions are essentially unavailable to those injured by non-Y2K-compatible software.
C. The Inadequacy of Fraud Actions
{22} Fraud and intentional misrepresentation are tort recovery actions often used to sidestep contractual
limits on recovery. [84] Like products liability actions, the standards for fraud actions vary somewhat among
the states. [85] Generally, a plaintiff in an intentional fraud action must prove the following: (1) the seller
made false representations of fact; (2) for the purpose of inducing the buyer to enter into the contract; (3)
with knowledge of their falsity or a reckless disregard for the truth; (4) that were material to the bargain; and
(5) and reasonably relied upon by the purchaser. [86] The concealment or nondisclosure of a material fact can
form the basis for a fraud action. [87] Fraud damages typically include direct damages, any consequential
economic loss the plaintiff can prove with reasonable certainty, and because this is an intentional tort,
punitive damages. [88]
{23} The main impediments to adequate plaintiff recovery on fraud grounds is the simple difficulty of
proving a defendant's knowledge of a statement's falsity and the probable lack of intentionally false
statements of Y2K-compatibility. A party misinformed of the Y2K-compliance of purchased software must
leap the high hurdle of proving not only that a defendant actually made a statement that was material and
false, but also that the defendant knew of, or acted in reckless disregard for, the statement's falsity. Also, in
light of the recent growing awareness of the Y2K Problem, it is quite unlikely that software makers (among
the most Y2K-aware parties) would purposely falsely represent the Y2K-compatibility of their software; such
activity is simply too dangerous from a business standpoint.
D. The Inadequacy of Negligent Misrepresentation Actions
{24} In states that have them, negligent misrepresentation statutes are often identical to or closely resemble
Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which reads in relevant part:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss
caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise
reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information. [89]
{25} At first glance, negligent (as opposed to intentional) misrepresentation may appear to be a viable cause
of action against software vendors, largely because plaintiffs need not prove the defendant's deceptive intent.
A further examination of the concept reveals its undercompensatory nature, however. [90] Plaintiffs may not
recover for pecuniary losses. [91] Also, the supplier of the information must supply the information in the
course of his business. Most courts construe this to mean that the actor's business must be that of supplying
information, not merely that the actor supplied the false information in the course of any business. [92]
Software providers are generally supplying a product, not information. Also, the information must be
supplied to guide the recipient in relation to third parties. [93] While negligent representations about Y2K
compatibility may affect a plaintiff's relationship with third parties, those representations are not meant to

guide software buyers in their business relations with others. This seems to generally preclude liability on the
part of software providers and impose liability instead on computer consultant companies. Indeed, courts
have so held. [94]

IV. The Inadequacies of the Common Negligence Tort
{26} The above inadequacies of non-negligence causes of action will likely push Y2K plaintiffs toward
negligence actions. While negligence actions may under current law provide a more likely means to recover
damages, proceeding under such a theory is also quite problematic.
{27} First, actions in negligence are subject to strong defenses. The aforementioned economic loss doctrine
will often bar or greatly inhibit recovery. In addition, defendants will assert that, because the plaintiff's
software has yet to malfunction, they have suffered no harm and have no standing to seek recompense. Intuit,
Inc., the maker of Quicken software, successfully asserted this notion, among others, in having the complaint
against it dismissed in a class action Y2K case. [95] Strictly speaking, this will not bar recovery, only
postpone it, but it still harms plaintiffs because they must: 1) incur the additional cost of filing an amended
complaint likely subject to the same attack; 2) pursue a less appealing but more immediate cause of action; or
3) wait until harm has befallen them to file suit. In addition to standing issues, defendants in Y2K cases will
likely point to contractual negligence liability disclaimers. Persons not recognized as professionals can
generally disclaim their liability in negligence; whereas, professionals generally may not. [96] Courts have
been loathe to label software vendors as professionals, [97] and to thus allow such disclaimers from them.
Plaintiffs then bear the burden of proving these disclaimers unconscionable, a very difficult task indeed. [98]
{28} Second, and more important to the purposes of this article, the traditional negligence tort will hold
software creators to the usual "reasonable actor" standard, a standard problematic in the Y2K context. This
standard will vary from case to case and from jury to jury, in light of the evidence introduced as to the
appropriate level of care. What is found to be negligent in one case may be found to be not negligent in
another. Triers of fact have no set standard to guide them. A singular standard of care particular to software
engineers in the Y2K context is needed. This new standard will not only hold software vendors to an
appropriate care level based upon industry standards, but will also provide a uniform standard within and
among jurisdictions. This new standard should be flexible, however, it must not delineate activity that is per
se negligent. Rather, it must account for variations of fact by delineating certain activities which must be
performed when ensuring Y2K-compatibility of software products and provide that failure to perform these
activities creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence. Lastly, this standard must be statutorily
promulgated; judicial reticence to adopt one necessitates such. If properly researched, drafted, and issued,
such a statute will hold all software engineers to a uniform standard of care commensurate with a
professional actor having the level of expertise expected of an individual employed in the relevant field. The
tort of computer malpractice can serve as a model for this proposed statute because like other malpractice
actions, it considers industry standards in its analysis of negligence.

V. The Brief Rise and Fall of the Tort of Computer Malpractice
{29} Though not characterized as such, the first inklings of a computer malpractice tort arose in the 1977
case of F & M Shaefer Corp. v. Electronic Data Systems Corp. [99] Plaintiff F & M Shaefer Corporation and
defendant Electronic Data Systems had contracted for Electronic Data Systems in relevant part to develop
and to install a modern computer system for F & M Shaefer. [100] F & M Shaefer filed suit following
repeated malfunctions of the system. [101] The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
determined that a special relationship existed between the plaintiff and defendant in this case based upon F &
M Shaefer's necessary reliance on Electronic Data Systems's technically complex knowledge of an arena of
which Shaefer had no knowledge. [102] Therefore, as is prevalent in malpractice cases, the court ruled that

the statute of limitations should begin to run only upon the cessation of this continuing professional
relationship. [103] While, no court ever reached the issue of professional duty in this case due to its eventual
settlement, [104] the idea that heavy reliance on a computer company's technical knowledge may create in
them a heightened standard was proffered.
{30} The first overt attempt by a plaintiff to characterize a defendant's conduct as computer malpractice came
in a similar vein in Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. [105] Plaintiff, Triangle Underwriters, Inc.
alleged that a computer system consisting of both hardware and software purchased from defendant
Honeywell, Inc. failed to perform and sought relief on grounds of negligence, fraudulent inducement, breach
of contract, and breach of warranty. [106] The court held the contract and negligence causes of action were
time barred. [107] In an attempt to circumvent the same statutes of limitations that barred those claims,
Triangle Underwriters, Inc. additionally alleged that Honeywell, Inc. failed to supervise and correct
deficiencies in the system and wrongfully withdrew their support personnel, characterizing these actions as
"computer malpractice" [108] subject to the "continuous treatment" doctrine recognized in malpractice
actions. [109] The continuous treatment doctrine, briefly mentioned above in F & M Shaefer Corp., dictates
that the statute of limitations in medical malpractice actions begins to run at the end of continuous treatment
or the physician-patient relationship because a patient is not expected to interrupt a continuing course of
treatment "by serving a summons on the physician or hospital superintendent . . ." [110] The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals recognized that New York courts had extended the continuous doctrine outside the medical
realm, [111] but refused to extend it to the tort of computer malpractice, finding that, "there is wholly lacking
in the case at bar that professional relationship upon which application of the doctrine, [of continuous
treatment] in any context, depends." [112] This court also emphasized the element of reliance between the
parties, perhaps providing for computer malpractice actions in cases of substantial reliance. [113] While,
Triangle Underwriters, Inc. was probably more concerned with overcoming their limitations problems than
with the characterization of their claims as computer malpractice, the significance of this case lies in its
recognition of the tort and in its indirect support of F & M Shaefer Corp.'s theory that increased responsibility
may accompany increased reliance.
{31} Later that same year, the U.S. District Court for New Jersey addressed the issue of a computer
malpractice claim, albeit briefly. In Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., [114] plaintiff,
Chatlos Systems, Inc., filed suit following the purchase and installation of an allegedly faulty computer
system from defendant, National Cash Register Corp. [115] The court rejected Chatlos Systems, Inc.'s
computer malpractice claim in its first footnote (and similarly, did not address it in the opinion's body) upon
the reasoning that the general technical complexity and importance to the business world of National Cash
Register Corp.'s endeavors did not justify an increase in their potential liability exposure. [116] The court also
based their rejection upon the "absence of sound precedential authority." [117] By 1980, no court had
recognized the tort of computer malpractice. The undercurrent of reliance as a factor had nevertheless
provided one rationale for the action. [118]
{32} In 1986, the door was opened to impose malpractice liability on computer engineers in Data Processing
Services, Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp. [119] when Indiana's Fourth District Court of Appeal found computer
engineers were analogous to doctors or lawyers. [120] There, Data Processing Services, Inc. and L.H. Smith
Oil Corp. orally agreed that Data Processing Services, Inc. would create accounting software for Smith. [121]
After Smith failed to make timely payments, Data Processing Services, Inc. sued and L.H. Smith Oil Corp.
counterclaimed for breach of contract. [122] The Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
award of damages of $33,000 in favor of L.H. Smith Oil Corp., [123] on the basis that Data Processing
Services, Inc. held itself out as possessing skill and qualifications in its respective profession and breached its
implied representation that it would perform with the skill and diligence ordinarily possessed by other wellinformed members of their possession. [124] This idea was not unique. [125] Quite unique, however, was the
court's position that "[t]he situation here is more analogous to a client seeking a lawyer's advice or a patient
seeking medical treatment for a particular ailment than it is to a customer buying seed corn, soap, or cam

shafts." [126] The court's direct analogy between computer engineers and doctors and lawyers, the latter of
which are clearly actors subject to professional malpractice, pushed slightly ajar the door to computer
malpractice claims. This idea, coupled with the substantial reliance rationale explained above, forms the basis
for the call for recognition of the computer malpractice tort.
{33} The next relevant case in this area was Diversified Graphics, Ltd. v. Groves. [127] While views conflict
on the importance of this case to the evolution of computer malpractice tort, [128] the court's notions of
professional standards are relevant to this article. Plaintiff Diversified Graphics, Ltd. and Ernst & Whinney,
of whom defendant Groves was chairman, contracted that Ernst & Whinney would advise Diversified
Graphics, Ltd. on the purchase and installation of a computer system. [129] Ernst & Whinney selected a
vendor from which Diversified Graphics, Ltd. purchased a computer system. [130] After the system proved
difficult to operate and inadequate to perform Diversified Graphics, Ltd.'s necessary functions, Diversified
Graphics, Ltd. filed suit against Ernst & Whinney asserting various claims including negligence. [131]
Following a jury verdict amounting to $82,500, Ernst & Whinney appealed upon the grounds that the district
court should have held it to an ordinary standard of care rather than to the professional standard of care it
applied. [132] The district court instructed the jury with pattern instructions used in actions against
physicians. [133] The Eighth Circuit decided that Ernst & Whinney had been appropriately held to a
professional standard of care, on the grounds that a negligence action based upon a client-consultant
relationship generally gives rise to a professional standard, of care. [134] In so doing, the court discussed two
important concepts. First, the court stated that "[t]he degree of skill and care . . . required of a professional is
a question of fact for the jury." [135] Ernst & Whinney had contended that Diversified Graphics, Ltd. failed
to adequately define the applicable professional standard but the court found that Diversified Graphics, Ltd.'s
expert had appropriately elucidated applicable standards. [136] Obviously, if the appropriate standard of care
was statutorily elucidated and uniform, this entire analysis would be unnecessary. Second, and relatedly, the
court placed much emphasis on standards adopted by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
[137] It found that ample evidence existed to establish the defendant's failure to meet those standards. [138]
While the lack of a comprehensive licensing scheme for software engineers is often cited as a reason for
denial of malpractice liability, [139] applicable industry standards can provide a suitable alternative basis
upon which to craft a common standard of care. Despite this application of a professional standard, this case
was not deemed a malpractice action. [140] Two significant features of malpractice actions, however,
occurred in this case: "[f]irst, an elevated standard of care was applied;" second, Diversified Graphics, Ltd.,
acting in tort, recovered economic loss damages. [141]
{34} Following Data Processing Services [142] and Diversified Graphics, [143] legal scholars and
practitioners might have foreseen the coming of a computer malpractice tort analogous to medical or legal
malpractice and based upon ideas of increasing reliance, the necessity of a common standard of care, and the
availability of industry standards, even in the absence of a licensure requirement. Such a standard would
provide the very benefits this article advocates: a higher standard of care, uniformity of application, and
predictability and efficiency in and out of the courtroom. Courts, however, remained unwilling to build such a
cause of action upon this foundation, [144] largely because of the precedential notion that a lack of a
licensing scheme precludes imposition of professional liability. It is this unwillingness that necessitates a call
for statutory guidance. A statute seeking to delineate a uniform standard of care must be based on the
benchmark looked to in individual cases -- industry standards.

VI. An Examination of Some Basic Standards
{35} Industry standards for Y2K-compliance amply describe what a product must do to be deemed Y2Kcompliant. For instance, several federal agencies have issued a regulation defining Y2K-compliant with
respect to information technology:

[T]he information technology accurately processes date/time data (including, but not
limited to, calculating, comparing, and sequencing) from, into, and between the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries, and the years 1999 and 2000 and leap year calculations, to the
extent that other information technology, used in combination with the information
technology being acquired, properly exchanges date/time data with it. [145]
Most definitions of Y2K-compliance appropriately focus on this end result - the ability of software or
hardware to perform certain calculations. These standards generally do not define, nor address the testing that
software must undergo to ensure its Y2K compliance. Because a technical review of available software
testing procedures is beyond the scope of this article, and largely beyond the knowledge of the common
person, this article will examine, with more particularity than the above-quoted definition, what software
must be able to do so as not to malfunction, and then posit that failure to appropriately test one's product to
ensure its capability to perform these basic functions constitutes presumptive negligence.
{36} The British Standards Institution has issued a document entitled, A Definition of Year 2000 Conformity
Requirements. [146] Its definition of Y2K compliance contains four rules. First, no value for the current date,
whatever that may be, will cause any interruption in operation. Second, date-based functioning must operate
consistently for all dates before, during, and after the year 2000. Third, in all data storage and interfaces, the
century in any date must be delineated either explicitly (four-digit year displays) or by unambiguous
algorithms. Fourth, the year 2000 must be recognized as a leap year. [147] Put simply, the British Standards
Institute's definition of Y2K conformity, thus, contemplates software that can correctly recognize the current
date, correctly perform any date-based calculation, and accurately depict the date to users. The ability to
recognize and to perform calculations based on dates before and after January 1, 2000, is predictably a
dominant theme in Y2K conformity standards.
{37} Other standards reach the same basic conclusion through more specific language concerning software's
practical operation. GTE has also issued proposed criteria for what they term "century compliance." [148] In
the above vein, GTE notes that Y2K-compliant software must be able to "correctly handle all representations
and manipulation of dates . . . between [January 1, 1900] and [December 31, 2050]." [149] Within its
criterion that no value for a current date may cause interruptions in normal function, however, GTE
additionally lists several critical midnight crossings that may cause problems, including the midnight
crossings that will lead into January 1, 2000, the fundamental millennium transition, and February 28, 2000,
the first leap day of the new millennium. [150] Other potentially troublesome dates include January 10, 2000,
the first seven-character date; October 10, 2000, the first eight-character date; December 31, 2000, the 366th
day of the year; and January 1, 2001, the exit from the year 2000. [151]
{38} A software program's ability to continue normal operations during and after these critical midnight
crossings, and to compute and recognize dates and durations is usually tested through simulation of the
crossings. [152] Software testers simulate the crossing by making the software "think" (usually through
setting the hardware's date) that the current time is just before midnight on December 31, 1999. [153]
Optimally date-dependant data should be previously entered into the software. The computer is then allowed
to run through its simulated crossing and its ability to continue functioning and to correctly recognize and
process dates and durations is observed. [154] The date-dependant data previously entered is evaluated to
ensure its intact survival of the transition. [155]

VII. A Statutory Proposal
{39} Any statute purporting to regulate the standard of care in negligence actions based on non-Y2Kcompatibility must simply state a basic level of care. The level of care must be such that failure of the
reasonable software engineer to adhere to it quite clearly would be negligent. It must be founded upon basic

industry testing practices concerning Y2K-compatibility and drafted with an eye toward clarity and efficiency
of application. The following theoretical statute could accomplish these results:
In negligence actions based on non-Y2K-compatibility of any software product, excluding
embedded software or embedded chip technology, a software manufacturer marketing a
software product on or after January 1, 1996 will be presumed negligent in the
manufacture of its product if:
(1) (a) the manufacturer, prior to marketing the software product:
(i) fails to test its ability to perform any critical midnight crossing
by simulation of the crossing; or
(ii) tests its ability to perform any critical midnight crossing by
simulation of the crossing, the software fails to operate properly
upon making the test crossing, and the manufacturer markets the
product; and
(b) the software fails to operate properly upon making the crossing.
(c) For purposes of this section,
(i) failure to operate properly when making a midnight crossing
includes but is not limited to failure to operate, failure to properly
interact with other software or hardware components,
miscalculation, and data loss.
(ii) critical midnight crossings include the crossings into the dates of
January 1, 2000; February 29, 2000; and December 31, 2000; or
(2) (a) the manufacturer, prior to marketing the software product,
(i) fails to test its ability to recognize dates before, after, and upon
January 1, 2000 by simulation of current date environments lying
before, after, and upon January 1, 2000; or
(ii) tests its ability to recognized dates before, after, and upon
January 1, 2000 by simulation of current date environments lying
before, after, and upon January 1, 2000; the software fails to
properly recognize any date upon testing; and the manufacturer
markets the product; and
(b) the software fails to properly recognize any date before, after, or upon
January 1, 2000.
(c) For purposes of this section, failure to properly recognize dates includes but
is not limited to failure to properly compute the current date, failure to
recognize that any date exists, and failure to properly determine in which

century a particular date lies; or
(3) (a) the manufacturer, prior to marketing the software product,
(i) fails to test its ability to calculate durations lying wholly before,
wholly after, and crossing January 1, 2000 by test calculation of
each of the above three types of durations in simulated
environments occurring before, after, and upon January 1, 2000; or
(ii) tests its ability to calculate durations lying wholly before, wholly
after, and crossing January 1, 2000 by test calculation of each of the
above three types of durations in simulated environments occurring
before, after, and upon January 1, 2000; the software fails to
properly calculate any such duration upon testing; and the
manufacturer markets the product; and
(b) the software fails to properly calculate any such duration.
(c) For purposes of this section, failure to properly calculate durations includes
but is not limited to failure to calculate the proper number of time units
between two dates.
{40} Four important points arise within the introductory paragraph of the statute. First, this standard of care
applies to software manufacturers who market their product on, or after January 1, 1996. The date of
development, manufacture, or initial marketing of the product is irrelevant. If a software product is being
marketed after January 1, 1996, the statutory standard of care will apply. For example, a producer that
completes manufacture of its product in 1992, but does not market it until 1997, falls within the ambit of this
statute, as does a producer who first markets a product in 1992, and continues to market that product beyond
January 1, 1996. Second, the date of January 1, 1996 has been selected for imposition of the standard, on the
basis that, as a whole, the informed public had, by then, at least heard of the Y2K Problem. Thus, software
manufacturers should also be expected to account for the potential problem. Third, this statute presupposes
no finding of negligence as a matter of law in the event of its violation; it imposes a rebuttable presumption of
negligence upon those failing to adhere to it. The burden of proof then shifts to the defendant to proffer
evidence of non-negligence sufficient to overcome the presumption. In light of the very basic standard of care
delineated, this burden-shifting is reasonable. Fourth, this statute expressly excludes embedded software and
embedded chip technology producers. While, embedded software producers find themselves in a similar legal
position in the Y2K context, the potential for holding such actors to an identical standard of care is beyond
the scope of this article.
{41} Section One of the statute pertains solely to critical midnight crossings. If a software manufacturer fails
to test its product's ability to perform any critical midnight crossing, and the software subsequently fails to
operate properly upon making the crossing, the manufacturer shall be presumed negligent. The testing, of
course, must occur prior to any marketing of the product occurring after January 1, 1996, and must consist of
simulation of the crossing environment. The myriad of software programs precludes a more specific
description of the required testing procedures; some variance must be allowed for application-specific,
crossing simulations. In addition, one will be presumptively negligent under subsection (ii) if tests reveal
Y2K-related operation errors but the manufacturer markets the product anyway. [156] A non-exhaustive list
of examples of failure to operate properly can be found in subsection (c)(i). Subsection (c)(ii) lists three dates
which should be crossed into during testing. January 1, 2000, as the primarily problematic millennium

crossover, is vital to any basic standard of care. The other two dates, February 29, 2000, used to recognize
that 2000 is a leap year, and December 31, 2000, the 366th day of the year, are less vital. Their removal
would likely not compromise the effectiveness of the statute, however their inclusion can only add to it. [157]
{42} The language in Sections Two and Three is patterned upon the language in Section One. Section Two
covers testing of proper recognition of dates lying before, after, and upon January 1, 2000, while Section
Three addresses the testing of proper duration calculations. Again both sections impose liability not only for
failure to test through environment simulation, but also for marketing a software product that has failed such
tests. Both subsections (c) include non-exhaustive lists of failure to properly operate. The length of
subsection (3)(a)(ii) necessitates explanation of its content. When testing for Y2K compliance, a software
manufacturer must ensure its software can calculate durations between dates lying wholly before, wholly
after, and across January 1, 2000. But software must be able to do this regardless of the current date--whether
it be before, after, or upon January 1, 2000. Therefore, a software manufacturer must test its product's ability
to perform each of the three types of calculations in each of the three simulated current date environments.

VIII. Conclusion
{43} A uniform statutory standard of care in the Y2K context for software manufacturers is necessary.
Society's increasing reliance, in business and non-business settings, upon computer industry actors; the
specialized, professional nature of software producers' education and day-to-day work; and judicial reticence
to adopt such a standard, provide rationales for this promulgation. More important, however, is the orderly,
predictable, and efficient administration of justice in this oncoming surge of litigation, which serves both as a
rationale for and result of the proposed statute. Protracted expert testimony as to the applicable standard of
care would be eliminated. Juries would not be asked to comprehend and to sort through highly-technical
testing procedures to determine which procedures a reasonable software manufacturer would have conducted,
and then decide whether the particular defendant before them had conducted them. The simple language of
the statute can lead them to the same conclusion without technical, industry-specific testimony. The
language's simplicity also facilitates the creation of associated jury instructions. Furthermore, a statutorily
elucidated standard of care allows for predictability during negotiation and litigation. Software manufacturers
need not guess as to what the applicable standard of care will be. They can determine with reasonable
certainty whether a presumption of negligence will arise against them, and they can accordingly plan their
daily operations, settlement strategy, and trial focus. Plaintiffs too can readily ascertain the evidence
necessary to cause such a presumption to arise. Lastly, verdict uniformity will result. With an identical
standard of care applied throughout any jurisdiction subject to the statute, similar factual scenarios should
create similar results. There should be few, if any circumstances, wherein, identically-situated software
manufacturers find themselves differently situated after appealing to a trier of fact. For these reasons, a statute
holding all software manufacturers to a uniform standard of care for Y2K compatibility for their products is
an enactment past due.
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